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AMERICAN EMBASSY, TOKYO TEL. 583-7141 EXT. 7919 
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 
REMARKS BY U.S. AMBASSADOR MIKE MANSFIELD 
FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS' CLUB OF JAPAN 
TOKYO, MAY 22, 1980 
It has been my good fortune to serve in Japan almost 
three years. That does not make me an old-timer by the 
standards of this group, but at least I am no longer the new 
boy on the block. Much has happened during that period--in 
Japan (although not every week has been as dramatic as the one 
just past), in the relations between Japan and the United 
States, and in the world environment surrounding us both. 
That old adage, "nothing is as constant as change" applies as 
much to U.S.-Japan relations as it does to life. But even 
measured against the rapid pace of change to which any observ-
er of Japan is accustomed, these last few years have been 
extraordinary. 
80-7R 
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I wou ld l ike to talk about some of those changes and 
what I think they mean . I don ' t propose to give you my 
analysis of the domestic political situation today , except 
to say that what we have seen il l ustrates one of the basic 
characteristics of democracy--it is unpredictable , and a 
little untidy . It makes life difficult for pundits, and some-
times for politicians . These remarks were prepared for the 
most part before last Friday ' s events , and I have felt no need 
to change them . Whatever has transpired, I believe there is 
a broad consensus in this country which underlies Japan ' s 
foreign policy in general and its ties with the United States 
in particular, and that it remains fully intact . 
I also do not intend today to try to predict the 
future--I prefer to leave that to members of the Fourth Estate. 
But I think it is possible to identify some trends, and perhaps 
to project them some distance into the 80s in a general way . 
I believe that to some extent perceptions in the United 
States and here as well have lagged behind the realities . 
While there may be a general awareness that changes have taken 
place in our relations, their meaning has not been fully 
appreciated. The perception gap is narrowing, however, and 
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I would like to try to contribute to that process today . 
I believe the United States and Japan are approaching a new 
stage in their relationship. Let me explain what I mean. 
A brief look back is instructive. When Prime Minister 
Fukuda traveled to Washington in May of 1977 for his first 
meeting with President Carter, the major issues included 
Japanese concern over the prospect of a U.S . military withdrawal 
from Korea; our nuclear non-proliferation policy and how it 
might affect Japan's nuclear energy program; and color televi-
sion and steel imports. In 1978 we moved from color TVs to 
other sectorial and macroeconomic issues of even greater scope 
and severity. Japan's massive current account surplus; the 
huge imbalance in our bilateral trade; questions of growth 
rates and of access to the Japanese market--all of these monop-
olized the attention of policy makers on both sides of the 
ocean and were the subject of as intensive a process of 
bilateral economic negotiations as any the United States has 
undertaken. That complex of economic issues dominated our 
discourse throughout 1978 and into last year. It received 
massive press coverage, and seemed at times to pose a serious 
threat to our overall ties. 
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The fact that none of these issues was at the top of 
the agenda in Prime Minister Ohira's recent meeting with the 
President was not solely a function of our attention having 
been turned toward Iran or Afghanistan. It also reflected the 
rather remarkable success we have had over the past three years 
in dealing with our bilateral problems. We have improved 
significantly during that period the mechanisms available to 
us for monitoring and managing our economic ties. We have 
established new instruments of consultation, ranging from a 
Trade Facilitation Committee to a Wise Men's Group. We have 
increased both the candor and the frequency of our informal 
consultations--the day-to-day contacts at all levels of our 
two governments which are so essential to cooperative relations. 
Our aim in all of this has been to identify problems at an 
early stage, and to solve them before they become unmanageable. 
We have emerged successfully from a difficult and sometimes 
disputatious period. We have been successful because we have 
dealt with the problems in a mutual way, our institutions have 
been joint institutions, and our approaches have been common 
approaches. I think the experience has bred a heightened 
sensitivity on both sides to the needtopay the closest attention 
to our economic ties--and it has also given us greater confidence 
in our ability to control events and influence the directions 
in which our economic relations move. 
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I am not suggesting that we are out of the woods. 
There will always be problems in an economic relationship as 
large as ours, affecting as it does the well-being of so many 
people in both our countries. And at any given time one or 
more of those problems is likely to loom large. But, I have 
said this before and am convinced it is true--the real test 
of a relationship is not the presence or absence of problems, 
but the capacity of the partners in that relationship to deal_ 
with those problems. We have passed that test with flying 
colors,and we will do equally well in the years ahead. 
While our attention was fastened on economic problems 
during most of the past three years, some important progress 
was being made, quietly and without fanfare, in other areas. 
Developments in our security relationship have been especially 
noteworthy in recent years. The change has been even more 
pronounced if one looks back a bit further--it was twenty 
years ago this week that the Lower House ratified the Mutual 
Security Treaty, to the accompaniment of street demonstrations. 
In the past few months we have witnessed a lively 
public discussion in this country of the international 
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security environment and the proper Japanese response to it. 
To what extent does the Soviet force buildup in this region, 
or heightened tensions in the Middle East impinge directly 
on Japan's safety and well-being , and what should this mean 
f or Japanese security policy? What are the implications 
of these developments for the U.S.-Japan security relationship? 
For Japanese defense spending? In my opinion this is a healthy , 
andnece ssarypublic debate--and the fact that such questions 
can now be addressed objectively and without great public 
rancor or political turmoil is itself a measure of the 
change which has occurred. 
Quite understandably, considerable attention is paid in 
all of this to the United States, and what it is we are said 
to want Japan to do. Our position is sometimes misunderstood. 
We have let it be known for years, publicly and privately, 
that in our view some improvement in Japan's forces was neces-
sary. This continues to be our position. We welcome the 
measures Japan has already taken to strengthen its self-defense 
capability, including decisions to purchase the F-15, P-3C and 
E-2C, as well as other modern we apons systems. We are also 
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gratified by Japan's increasing contribution to the costs of 
maintaining our forces in this country. And we are encouraged 
by the progress achieved by our uniformed services in developing 
more detailed contingency plans, in accordance with the planning 
guidelines adopted by our two governments in 1978. 
All of these developments enhance the credibility of 
Japan's self-defense capability, and in so doing add strength 
to the U.S.-Japan security relationship and the contribution 
it makes to the peace and stability of East Asia. We have 
expressed our hope that steady and significant progress 
can be maintained in all these areas, recognizing that this 
would entail commensurate increases in Japanese defense 
spending. But we do not and will not presume to tell Japan 
how to spend the money it budgets for defense. We maintain 
a continuing dialogue on all of these issues, as is proper and 
necessary in an alliance. However, we recognize and respect 
the fact that the pace, the extent and the direction of any 
increase in Japan's defense efforts remain, as they have always 
been, sovereign decisions for Japan to make. 
There has been another important development in recent 
years in this country--perhaps less a new development than the 
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acceleration of a trend visible for a long time: the increasing 
scope and activism of Japanese diplomacy. Most of you would 
agree that Japan's political influence in the world, and its 
diplomatic reach, have not expanded as rapidly as has its 
economic power and worldwide network of economic interests. 
That anomaly has been significantly reduced in the last few 
years, however, as Japan has taken on major political respon-
sibilities in a number of areas. In Southeast Asia, Japan's 
relations with the ASEAN countries can no longer be defined 
solely in economic terms; Japan's political and diplomatic 
support for those nations, no less than its large and indis-
pensable contribution to the Indochina refugee relief effort, 
has added new depth to its role in that region. Japan has 
been in the forefront of international efforts to deal with 
the crises of Iran and Afghanistan, which I will discuss more 
fully a bit later on. I believe there is also a growing 
political dimension to Japan's ties with the nations of 
Western Europe. Japan's leading role in the economic summit 
process has been one factor encouraging this development; 
another it seems to me has been the close coordination we have 
seen recently between Japan and Europe brought about by the 
perceived need to develop a common response to the situations 
in Iran and Afghanistan. I find this a fascinating phenomenon, 
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and while its full impact may not be felt for a number of 
years, its meaning is clear--Japan is going to play an 
increasingly important and varied role in the world. 
This has important implications for all nations. For 
the United States it means that our ties with Japan, already 
the most important bilateral relationship we have, will take 
on even greater significance. It will become even more 
essential that we consult closely with each other and try to 
coordinate our policies as much as we can. I am convinced 
that the general orientation of our foreign policies will 
remain parallel, resting as they do on a foundation of similar 
values, interests and objectives. Thus there is no reason to 
expect any diminution in Japanese and American cooperation 
vis-a-vis major international issues, be they political, 
economic, scientific or security-related. On the contrary, 
I believe our cooperation will increase, producing major 
benefits not only for Japanandthe United States, but for 
the world. 
Iran and Afghanistan have of course been major foreign 
policy preoccupations in recent months for the United States, 
and I belie ve for Japan, and both illustrate the importance 
and the effectiveness of cooperation between our two nations. 
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As President Carter made clear to Prime Minister Ohira three. 
weeks ago, the United States deeply appreciates the efforts 
Japan has made in respect to both these crises. On Iran, 
Japan has spoken out vigorously in behalf of legal and 
humanit a rian principle, denouncing the hostage seizure and 
calling for the immediate release of those innocent people. 
It has joined with our European friends and others around 
the world in imposing, this week, economic sanctions a gainst 
Iran which we hope will speed the return of rationality to 
that country and lead to freedom for our fellow Americans 
in the not too distant future. Japan's actions have not been 
risk free. We are grateful for what it has done. 
In respect to Afghanistan as well, Japan has worked 
closely with the United States and our other allies to impose 
penalties upon the Soviet Union for its invasion of that 
country and to insure the Soviets understand that neither 
this nor future such actions can be taken with impunity and 
without grave risk. Japan has spoken out, and it has acted. 
Japan is a participant in a framework of economic sanctions 
which we hope will have an important cumulative effect. The 
Japanese Government has also called upon this country to join 
in a more visible, and very meaningfull symbolic sanction--the 
Olympic boycott. 
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The challenges posed by events in Iran and Afghanistan, 
like some of the economic and other problems we have had to 
grapple with in the recent past, have imposed some strains 
on our relations. Difficult decisions have been required, 
hard choices have had to be made. Satisfactory conclusions 
to both of these situations seem some distance away, which 
is discouraging. But what is not discouraging--indeed, it 
is most heartening--is the degree of unity and coordinated 
action we have seen on the part of Japan, the United States 
and our other friends and allies in the face of these 
challenges. We have occasionally differed on tactics, on 
emphasis, on timing--we are not a monolith. But we have remained 
united, and we are determined to stay the course. We have 
often remarked, in speeches such as this one, on the growing 
multilateral dimension of U.S.-Japan relations. I believe 
that concept has been given new and more concrete meaning as 
a result of Iran and Afghanistan, and that there is now a 
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stronger commitment, on both sides of the Pacific, to mutual 
goals and to joint action in achieving them. 
This brings me to a final thought, concerning Japan's 
international role and the nature of the U.S.-Japan relation-
ship as I see it at this stage in its history . We have 
spoken for years of the steady progress of our two nations 
toward a more equal partnership, as Japan has assumed inter-
national responsibilities commensurate with its economic power. 
But I have the sense that only very recently has this concept 
begun to be accepted by the Japanese people. The crises in 
Iran and Afghanistan in particular have contributed to this 
phenomenon. Clearly the Iran situation has been one in which 
the United States has needed the support of its friends, in 
Japan, in Europe and elsewhere. Events in both Iran and 
Afghanistan threaten the interests of the international commu-
nity as a whole, and have required a united response by peace-
loving nations . Japan has responded to these needs, demonstrating 
in the process--for its own people, for Americans and for the 
world--that Japan is a factor to be reckoned with on the 
international scene , and that our partnership is a two-way 
street in more than just matters of trade. I detect pride 
in that fact among the Japanese people , and heightened solidarity 
with the United States. 
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Along with more widespread acceptance of the notion 
tfiat Japan is an equal partner of the United States, so there 
seems to be a greater readiness these days to define that 
partnership in ways the Japanese have tended to avoid up to 
now. As all of you will have noted, "alliance", a word seldom 
used in the past to describe Japan's relations with the United 
States, has been employed prominently in recent weeks. Perhaps --it is not proper for me to try to say what this means--indeed 
I am not sure that I know. But to me, the word fits the 
reality. We are allies in every sense, committed not only to 
friendship and cooperation in good times, but to mutual 
assistance in time of need, and I am glad that more and 
people in this country feel comfortable in saying so. 
I think there is an inexact, but relevant, economic 
parallel. Just as the Japanese are increasingly prepared to 
involve themselves politically in the world and to accept 
responsibilities of involvement and leadership, so it seems 
to me there has also been an important change in the way they 
look at their economic prospects. We Americans have often 
felt the Japanese have tended to exaggerate their weaknesses 
and vu~nerabilities and to minimize their strengths--and not 
simply as a negotiating tactic. Admittedly, our own views 
have sometimes been canted in the other direction--Japan is 
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not as awesome an economic machine as its foreign competitors 
sometimes fear, and it undoubtedly is vulnerable in some 
respects. But certainly the view of Japan, inculcated into 
generations of schoolchildren, as an isolated and in some ways 
beleagured island dependent for economic survival only upon the 
wits and determination of its traders is no longer entirely 
realistic . I believe it is being superseded by the more valid 
realization that Japan, as a full-fledged member of the Western 
industrialized community, partakes fully of the strengths as 
well as the weaknesses of that system. Its vulnerabilities 
are no greater than those of the other members, and its 
strengths certainly no less . Thus, there is a growing sense 
of a shared fate, a conviction that the well-being of this 
country is indivisible from that of its partners and dependent 
in turn on a stable world environment to which all must 
contribute . This is more than a philosophical notion; it has 
immense political significance, reinforcing Japan's global 
involvement and insuring its steadily growing importance on 
the world scene. 
Not all of the changes in the U.S.-Japan relationship 
have taken place on this side of the Pacific. There have been 
some important developments in the United States as well, and 
they are very similar to what has happened here . We have been 
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aware for many years of the extent of our economic interdependence 
with Japan. But for us, as for the Japanese, it has never been 
clearer that we are not only navigating the same hazardous 
waters, we are infact in the same boat. Cooperation and joint 
action in dealing with inflation or energy are not options, they 
are imperatives. As a nation, we have probably been less aware 
until recently of the fact that we and Japan are equally 
interdependent in other ways as well . The events of the past 
six months, in particular the Iran crisis, have been very 
revealing in this respect . We have sought the support of our 
friends and allies, and we have received it. 
I was convinced during my recent trip horne that Japan is 
seen in a new and rather different light. Public opinion -polls bear out my impression: a Potomac Associates survey 
taken last month showed significant increases in the percentage 
of Americans who rank Japan as the most important country for -----, 
the United States (89 percent--only Canada ranked higher); who 
would favor using armed force to defend Japan against attack 
from the Soviets or any other quarter; and who support the continued 
maintenance of our forces in this country. Clearly, Japan's 
contribution to our partnership, the value of its friendship, 
its steadfastness as an ally are much more broadly recognized 
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than was once the case . In short , there is a stronger 
commitment to the relationship among the American people, just 
as I believe is true in Japan. The conclusion I have reached 
and which I commend to you is that, while the crises of recent 
months have indeed generated tensions and imposed strains, our 
partnership has emerged not weaker, but stronger than before. 
We have truly gained strength from adversity. 
The years ahead promise to be as active and challenging 
for the United States as any period in our history, replete 
with crisis--andwithopportunity. We will face new problems 
that will not have occurred to even the most visionary among 
us. We will probably find ourselves contending as well with 
some old and familiar problems re-emerging in new and perhaps 
occasionally more virulent forms. But if we can be assured 
of difficulties in our path, so we can look ahead with equal 
certainty toward myriad new opportunities, in which Japan and 
the United States will merge their efforts in pursuit of 
common goals . 
I said at the outset that I was not going to try to 
predict the future. But as I think my remarks make clear, 
I am optimistic about the ability of the United States and 
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Japan, working together, to cope with anything it has to offer . 
Success is not assured, and we ignore the state of our relations 
only at our risk . For while our ties are strong , they are not, 
as we well know , inevitably trouble- free . Sus taining a productive 
partnership such as we enjoy requires the continued , dedicated 
attention of both our governments and , more fundamentally , 
patient and steady efforts to strengthen the foundation of 
understanding and mutual regard among all elements of our 
societies upon which all else rests . We can never eliminate 
problems in our relationship , or erase all our differences. 
Our task is to minimize those problems , narrow our differences 
as much as we can , and be prepared to to l erate opposing points 
of view when they cannot be reconciled. The formula is simple. 
Making it work can be difficult . We have succeeded in the past, 
however-- to the great benefit of our two peoples and of the 
world--and we shall in the future . 
* * * 
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AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD'S RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS POSED AT 
FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS CLUB 
May 22, 1980 
JOHN RODERICK (AP): Mr-:-Am b a s s a do r·; -yo u s p o k e a b o u t 
managing problems between- the United -states and Japan·· while 
they are- deve-lo-ping, howe-ver-m-a-de ·no references of course 
to .. adj.o-in-ing -co untries··. ·· Bu-t; as \'le kno~1, today a _very~ _gr_~ve 
pr:.a.b.J_e.m_is developing in South Korea. _ It started tO- lilO...\l.e 
.-. 6- .. -
a f·te-r-t~- assassin a ti-o rr-o f Pre~ i <teJTrP ark--tow a r.ds. democracy. 
It- has now been·-s-to-we-&-- ·tn·tn~tra-ck-5-. At this very moment 
~$ we stt r~Pa, the city of Kwangju is ta~en over by ele-
ments which seem to be favorable to democracy. What is the 
United States doing to s·-trit-ge manage O+:-ma-n.a-ge or do-in~·-to 
affect the outcome of this very grave struggle? 
AMBASSADOR: Well, John, what•s happening in the Repub-
1 ic of Korea is of great concern to all of us and to both 
our countries, but it just happens that Korea is outside 
my p o r t f o 1 i o . It also happens that we have probably our 
best ambas~ador in this part of th~ world, if not the best 
in the world, in Bill Gleysteen, and r•m sure that anything 
that can be done will be done by Bill Gleysteen, and that 
in his hands our interests are in good shape. (laughter) 
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BRUCE MACDONELL (NBC): Mr. Ambassador, you pointed 
out that there has been a . good deal of cooperation on the 
Iranian-Afghan issues. However, there is reason to believe 
that later a:n today the 'Olympics b-o-yc-o-t-t- -4--s-s-ue will b.e 
h-an-d-le-d--b-y allowi-n-g -~-e Japanese athletes to compete as 
individuals. If that is so, won't this be rather hollow 
cooperative success? 
AMBASSADOR: ~le-l-1 -,- Bruce, I referred to the attitude, 
aRd til-e pos,itive attitude, of the Japanese government in 
relation to a possible Olympic boycott. The Japanese gov-
ernment h~s m~de it clear to its Olympic Committee, as we 
made it clear to our Olympic Committee where we stood, and 
recognize the fact that the decision was in the hands of 
the respective Olympic Committees concerned. 
I personally am against the Olympics, not really 
because of Afghanist~n. but because it has become anything 
but the Olympic G~mes according to their original intent. 
They have be~n terrorized by the murder of the Israelis 
in Munich in '72. They have been commercialized long be-
fore th~t. They have been politicized to a la!ge extent, 
and I think that it is time for the Olympic Committees to 
take a look at what they're engaging in and try and do 
something to bring about a return to the original intent and 
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get away from these very heavy handicaps which are making 
it so difficult for these people today. 
I will wait and see just how they word that an-
nouncement which you indicated might be forthcoming today 
when the Olympic Committee of Japan issues its statement. 
GEBHARD HIELSCHER (Suddeutsche Zeitung): Mr. Ambassador, 
you have said that the Japanese-U.S. bilateral relations 
haye emerged as the most important bilateral relations for 
the U.S. I'm aware of evident changes in that relation. 
I am also aware of the results of the Potomac Associates 
survey which, though, also says, for instance, in the area 
of where you would be willing, how many people would feel 
it necessary that the U.S. should come to the defense of 
Japan in case of aggression, that 64 percent said so in the 
case of Japan, but more people said so in the case of 
Britain or France. 
So I'm just ~sking what other indications do you 
have to back up your statement of the most important bilateral 
relationship vis-a-vis some of the traditional allies like 
Britain or France in Europe, and could you elaborate in 
that context a little bit more on your experiences in Wash-
ington at the recent visit of Prime Minister Ohira? 
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AMBASSADOR: Well, that's a long question, but I'll 
do the best I can. First, let me say that the figure you 
used is correct, but I have felt for a long time that the 
United States has been paying too much attention to the 
Atlantic and Western Europe and not enough attention to 
the Pactfic and East Asia. I can understand why that re-
mains the policy, though I detect signs of its being 
shaken at present. 
Most of our people came from across the Atlantic, 
but since the time of Geo!ge Washington the push has always 
been we~tward across the continent, across the Pacific, 
into Asia. I think that thisis where everything is happen-
ing. 
I think the most important--! repeat--bilateral 
relationship we have in the world is with Japan. I think 
the most important strategic area in the world is in the 
North Pacific, not in Western Europe. If you look at the 
map, you will find the PRC, the Soviet Union, the U.S., 
Japan, right close to one another, and right in the middle 
is Korea which was the subject of the first question this 
afternoon. 
It is out here where American business has its 
opportunities, where the biggest returns are and where you 
have I think the most friendly governments, not only friendly 
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governments but friendly people, markets, resources, and 
to put it briefly I would say it is in the Pacific and 
E a s· t A s i a w li e r e i t a 11 i s , w h a t i t ' s a 1 1 a b o u t , a n d a s f a r 
as my country is concer~ed where their future lies. 
The relationship with Japa~ may not be as long 
as it has been with Germany, but there isn't too much dif-
ference when you get down to the time factors involved. 
As far as our cousins in the United Kingdom are concerned, 
that has been a long relationship, with France likewise, 
t~ough with many tremblers in between. But that's the way 
people _ get along. We have our differences with the French, 
with the British, with the Germans and with the Japanese, 
but if we didn't have these differences I don't think we 
would be very _ good friends. 
But to make it brief, this is where it all is and 
this is where we should have at least a strength based on 
parity wit~ what we have in the Atlantic and on Western 
Europe, and I think the events of Iran and Afghanistan 
are bringirg that home to us in a big way. We didn't act. 
We reacted. It's about time we started to do some acting 
ourselves .in shiftirg thro _ugh our priorities and recognizing 
where ~ur most important primary interests lie. (applause) 
/ 
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JQN WORONOFF (Asia Business): You mentioned at the very 
beginning that tnere are many surprises in politics. Can 
you explain how over time the American government and the 
Japanese government have been able to some extent to align 
their policy? What would happen if in another month or 
so there is another surprise and instead of having an LOP 
government there was a coalition government and among 
parties which have a slightly different attitude towards 
many of the policy points from the LOP? 
AMBASSADOR: Well, in politics the only certainty is 
uncertainty as was proven last Friday, and no one can be 
sure, and when I was in the Senate I was never certain 
till the votes were counted. Then I knew what the result 
really was. 
But as far as the differences are concerned, we 
can accommqdate ourselves with them. After all, the 
greatest art in the field of politics is compromise, or 
in other words accommodation. 
I dQ notwant to, as I've indicated in my remarks, 
become involved in Japanese internal politics. When what 
you envis~ge happens, then we'll face up to it, but no 
matter what it is I'm quite certain in my own mind that 
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the foundation on which Japanese-American partnership or 
friendship rests will survive, and _ grow stronger in the 
years and the decades ahead. 
UMAR "KAHN (Arab News Agency): Mr. Ambassador, in your 
remarks you said that whatever you have been doing until 
now was a reaction pertaini~g to certain things happening 
in my part of the world in the Middle East. You said that 
no~ it is time for you to do some action. So, what actions 
do you suggest to take, because let me just point out that 
the whole thing started in Afghanistan with the daylight 
murder of the American Ambassador over there, and President 
Carter simply said nothing and did nothi~g, and the whole 
thi~g started from there. 
And then this, I'm not sure, the action in Iran to 
rescue the 53 people. That's another thing, so are you 
wnich 
pointing out these actions/may cause another war in the world, 
or what actions are you pointing out to? 
AMBASSADOR: Quite the contrary. To answer you in one 
word, the policy I advocate is patience. (laughter and clapping) 
ROBERT NEFF (McGraw Hill): Mr. Ambassador, Reuben Askew 
left here a few days ago saying that he was very disappointed 
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with the lack of progress in the negotiations between the 
United States and Japan on the question of procurement by 
NTT. Just exactly where do those negotiations stand. You 
said in your speech you don't like to make predictions. 
What prospects do you see for a settlement, and how important 
an issue is this in Japanese-U.S. economic relations? 
AMBASSADOR: Well, I'm optimistic. I think there was 
a good, worthwhile excha~ge between the Japanese and Governor 
Askew while he was here. I would point out that the Straus-
Ushiba ~greement, which was initialed last June, still has 
till December 31st to run, and it's hoped that before that 
time, as a result of continued n~gotiations, that a reci-
procal agreement will be arrived at which will be mutually 
satisfactory to both countries. 
So I think that Askew made progress in widening 
the conversations, meeting with the appropriate people 
here as far as government procurement is concerned, and I 
think he made very good progress, too, as far as the auto-
mobile situation was concerned, all things considered. 
GEBHARD HIELSCHER (Suddeutsche Zeitung): At the recent 
Trilat e ral Confe r e nce in London, I think Mr. Ball suggested 
this idea of Japan could produce two aircraft carriers and 
. -· 
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lease them to the U.S. There was quite, shall we say, 
almost an unbelievable outr~ge type of reaction in Japan. 
Could 1ou elaborate a little bit? The U.S. government 
maybe hopes, or your personal views on the issue where 
1ou could see any scope for cooperation in Japan's military 
procurement or in arms production or any such lease ar-
rangement as Mr. Ball has suggested. Do you find that 
completely out of reality, or do you see, in contrast to 
Mr. Ball, any reasonable chance, even as a mid-term or 
long-term prospect? 
AMBASSADOR : The United States government has expressed 
no opinion on an opinion made by a private citizen 
George Ball. As far as my personal opinion is concerned, 
I think it's a way out, far out idea. We seem to have 
trouble findi~g enough personnel to man the carriers we 
haye at the present time. 
I don't think we ought to _ get Japan too involved. 
Japan has done remarkably well in its own defense situation 
in view of Article 9 of the so-called Peace Constitution, in 
view of how they had to getaround through the creation of a 
75,000 man Self Defense Force, and out of that came the 
Police Reserve Force, and out of that Police Reserve Force 
came the present Self Defense Forces. 
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The Japanese are not interested in becoming a 
manufacturi~g armory for other nations, and if there are 
things thqt have to be done I think we ought to be able 
to do them ourselves. 
Wnat I would ratner see would be the Japanese to 
c o n t i n u e . Th i s j s t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i 1 i t y w h a t t h e y h a v e b e e n 
doing for the last decade or more, and that is to modernize 
tneir naval elements and to update their anti-submarine 
and air defense facilities, and they are doing all those 
things. 
They have a part to play in the defense of their 
home islands and the ~eas adjacent thereto. They have to 
keep in mind the fact tnat th~y are not ready as yet to 
put into operation a regional force. And I would say, to 
repeat, that the Japanese have been doing the right thing 
at the right pace in the right way for the past decade. 
for example, during that decade they increased their defense 
expenditures at an average rate of 8 percent a year. The 
NATO countries increased their defense expenditures at a 
rate of 2 percent a year, and the United States decreased 
it~ defense expenffitures over the decade of the Seventies, the 
same period, at a rate of 2 percent a year. 
Now, th e progress of the Japanese in this respect 
hqs been steady and significant, and they have helped to 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 32, Box 1, Folder 51, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
11 
~chieve gre~t stability and to be able to fulfil their own 
respon~ibilities when, because of events in the Indian 
Ocean ~nd the Arabian Sea and that area, we had to trans-
fer elements of the Seventh Fleet to that particular 
region. 
TED SHIMIZU (Kyodo): Mr . Ambassador, what is your pre-
diction on the outcome of the U. S. presidential elections? 
AMBASSADOR: Hell, it looks like President Carter will 
get the nomination . It looks like John Anderson will be a 
$tron~er candidate than a lot of people anticipated, and if 
th~t is true he will draw votes mo s tly away from the Demo-
crats ~nd make it more difficult for the Democrats to win 
bec~u$e of the developing Carter-Kennedy feud, and it also 
might throw the election in the House of Representatives 
if neither Carter nor Reagan get the required majority. 
There, of course, it will be decided by the so-called 
electoral college, which is not a college. It has no 
professors. (.laughter) 
JON WORONOFF (Asia Business): I'm certain that you can 
keep on outwitting the working press . (laughter) I•m not 
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certain what your exact term was, whether its increasing 
agreement or accommodation or coming closer together be-
hieen the Japanese and the Americans on a number .of economic 
points. 
M1BASSADOR: Coming closer together. 
JOHN WORONOFF: Okay. How much of a gap is there, for 
example, on the question of defense? The Japanese seem to 
be willing within another few years to reach 1 percent. I 
have read that some people on the American side would like 
to see 1.5 or 2 percent. 
AMBASSADOR: No gap. It's up to the Japanese. After 
all, Japan is a sovereign nation. It has to make its own 
decisions. It has to decide what is best, and so far I 
think it has done a very good job on its own responsibility, 
a n d t h a t ' s the w a y i t s h o u 1 d be . T h at ' s the way i t w i 11 b e , 
and we are not . going to attempt in any way, shape or form to 
tell the ' Japanese what they should or shouldn't do. 
JOHN WORONOFF: Although there seems to be a slight cooling 
off of the problem regarding exports of automobiles to the 
United States, in the meanwhile Mr. Fraser, who addressed us 
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here some time ago, seems to have increased the ante, so the 
apart 
gap migQt be as far/or even further apart than it used to be. 
What are tne chances of tQe United States imposi~g limits 
on Japanese exports to th~ United States, and what is the 
chance of not only coming closer together but reaching some 
sort of an agreement which will hold? 
AMBASSADOR: Well, as far as reducing imports are con-
cerned, the President has made his position clear. Askew 
has made his position clear before congressional committees, 
and he did so again here even at his last press conference 
which I think you attended. He said he would not recommend 
import restrictions, that they would create a situation 
which could become highly inflationary and would not solve 
the problem of unemployment. 
I would point out that the Japanese have been making 
gestures and evolving policies. I recall that just about a 
year ago J sent letters to all the Japanese auto manufacturers 
asking them to use American auto parts. The Japanese auto 
manufacturers gave serious consideration to it, but I began 
to receive letters from them saying that at that time the 
American auto parts people were not interested or if they did their 
work wasn't up to Japanese standard. 
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And then, of course, we had the changeover which 
I think you can blame the· American auto industry for. 
The.y should have seen the ha~dwriting on the wall. In '73 
they started to change over then, and now they are trying 
to play catch-up, but it is . going to cost them 70 to 80 
billion dollars, and in the meantime you've got foreign 
cars taking over the field because that is what the 
American customers want. 
Honda is buildi~g a 10,000 auto facility in Ohio, 
and Nis~an has announced a 10,000 a month truck facility 
somew~ere in the Great Lakes or the southeast of the United 
States. Toyota has hired three high grade analytical groups 
to look into the situation as it might affect possible in-
vestments in the United States, and I think they are show-
ing good faith and for the first time are really getting 
down to bedrock. They're getting serious. 
Also, one of the results of Askew's trip here was 
an increp,sed amount in the purchase of American auto parts 
for Japanese cars, and we hope that progress will continue 
along that line. 
Now, you also mentioned I believe something about a 
1 or 1.5 percent defense expenditure. That is 1.5 percent 
of GNP. I notice where Admiral Zumwalt had something in 
the papers this morning advocating a 2 percent increase of 
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defen~e expenditures by Japan. You know, Zumwalt used 
to be t~e Chief of Naval Operations some eight or ten 
years ago, and now he's a private citizen. I think we 
ou~ht to try and keep the record clear. 
If we calculate Japanese defense expenditures on 
the same basis that NATO and the United States does, instead 
of ~pending less than l percent, they're spending some-
where between 1. l and 1. 2 percent. That • s a 1 ot of money. 
Even tho~gn it's from a small base, it's certainly a lot 
when it is tied to a GNP which totals well over a trillion 
dqllars. 
CHARLES SMITH (Financial Times): My question is partly 
asked, but maybe there is a bit more to say on the subject. 
Do you think it is realistic to expect Japanese car manu-
facturers to produce passenger cars in the United States 
when it seems to be the case that they can produce cars 
more efficiently and more cheaply in Japan? 
AMBASSADOR: Yes, I think it is. As I've told Mr. 
Ishiwara of Nissan and Mr. Goto--I think he's here this 
afternoon--of the same company, and Mr. Toyoda, I told them 
that it will be a good idea for them to invest in the United 
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States. Well, they raised questions about labor laws and 
this and that, and I pointed out the fact that Volkswagen 
came in, worked out a special deal I think for three years 
with the UAW. I'm sure it was probably given some tax 
concessions and maybe some land in the area in Pennsylvania 
in which they located their plant, and that the consensus 
was--that's - a nice Japanese word (laughter)--the consensus 
was tQat the quality of the American auto worker in 
Volkswagen, Pennsylvania, was better than the quality of the 
German worker in the Federal Republic. Now they are going 
to build a second plant outside of Detroit . 
What J told theJapanese when they raised the ques-
tion--arid their argume~ts were valid, after all, ~hev have 
to look at not only those factors but profitability as 
well--! told them it was my impression that the Japanese 
reputation was so _ good, based on quality product they 
produce at a competitive price, the follow-through services 
which they furnish and thedemand among the American people 
that they could _ go into any country in the world and compete 
with any auto company anywhere in the world and still come 
out even or on top. So tQey've . got the reputation. J 
they've . got the capability, they turn out the quality, the 
price is riqht. the people want it. they follow throuqh 
with service. I think thev can do it anywhere. 
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ALAN GOODALL (The Australian): Mr. Chairman, I would like 
to give an opportjnity to the Ambassador to answer a ques-
tion that his boss U.S. Secretary of State Muskie dodged 
yesterday, and that is how long can the United States con-
tlnue tQ support an ally that lacks internal political 
support, namely South Korea? 
AMBASSADOR: As long as necessary. (laughter - applause) 
ROBERT NEFF: To shift back to more mundane questions, 
the U.S. Customs has recently announced that it is going to 
start impo~ing a 25 percent import duty on Japanese truck 
imports. There are reports that President Carter probably 
will reduce that duty significantly. What indeed are the 
prospects? At what level are those import duties likely to 
be set, and to what extent is that issue linked to U.S. 
efforts to persuade the Japanese to build car factories in 
the U.S.? 
AMBASSADOR: To answer the last part of your question 
first, there is no connection between that and our efforts 
tQ get the Japanese to invest in the United States. As 
far as the fore part of your question is concerned, I read 
the same papers you have. I don't know too much about it 
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necqu~e we receive nothing in the way of an official dis-
patch. How do you like that for dodging? (laughter) 
But it's true. 
KEN KONDO (Mainichi): On the defense spending issue, 
you said that the Japanese are doing the right thing at 
the right pace, but I wonder do you think your assessment 
is reflected on Washington policy? 
AMBASSADOR: Let me get that again. 
KEN KONDO: Your assessment on Japanese defense spend-
ing or what we are doing on the defense issue, is your 
assessment reflected on the Washington policy, Administration 
polic¥, or your advice or your assessment is rather not 
neglected but ... 
AMBASSADOR: Well, my ad~ice that you so kindly re-
ferred tq hqs been passed on many times to the people in 
Was~ington, and if they don't know the facts it's their 
own fault. (laughter) 
LEE (Chosun Ilbo): I came from the trouble spot. (laughter) 
I heard from many Americans, including some officials, that 
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it 
they feel/no longer necessary to maintain American . ground 
forces in Korea where :Ame'rican influence is decreasing. But 
you just a w~ile ago stressed the strategic importance of 
Northeast Asia, including the Korean Peninsula. What is 
your evaluation, and do vou still feel it necessarv to 
maintain Americanground forces? 
AMBASSADOR: I approved of President Carter's view 
of w-ith.drawing the Second Division from Korea in . gradual 
~tages, but when some of our intelligence agencies came 
up with new estimates ... as to how strong North Korea 
actually was, I approved th.e postponement,announced in 
Korea last June I believe by the President, of the with-
drawal of the Second Division. I think that postponement 
will be indefinite. They will be there for a long time to 
come, but I would like to see the South Koreans themselves, 
once they achieve a degree of normality--though one finds 
i t h a r'd t o d e f i n e w h a t 11 n o r m a 1 i t y 11 i s i n t h e R e p u b 1 i c o f 
Korea--that they would be able to upgrade their equipment, 
both in the air, on land and at sea, and I would hope that 
out of these talks intermittently conducted between the 
North and South. Koreans, something substantial will develop, 
but there is no indication of that at the present time. 
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Sq we will just have to wait and see how events 
~ork out. lt'~ a sad country. It's a tragic country. It 
had more thqn it~ share of sorrow and sacrifice, but it is 
a friend, and we intend to stick with them to the end. 
UMAR KA~N; Mr. Ambassador, I own a small Honda 
Japanese car, and I think the secret of the Japanese car 
seen in America and everywhere was because they burn less 
.fuel. I think that was the only trick that was working for 
them . Do you think the GM and other big companies in 
America, giants, whose fund is more than probably some of 
these bi9 countries' total GNP, would they be sitting idle 
and not bringing out smaller cars to compete in technology 
and using lesser fuel than the Japanese plants that will 
be estqblished there? 
AMBASSADOR: Well, I would hope they're not sitting 
by idly because if they are it's just going to be a repeat 
of what has happened in years gone by because not only do 
ynu get better mileage out of Japanese cars, and some 
European cars as well, but you also have some excellent 
anti-pollution control devices and they are of better 
standards than the State of California, the strongest in 
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the cquntry as far as the ~tates are concerned, and they 
exceed the standards which the federal government has 
passed legislatively in the form of laws and which will 
go into effect I think in 1983 or 1984. If we are going 
to compete with the Japanese, we better compete and not 
~ust sit bqck or expect legislation to get us out of holes 
which we dig for ourselves. 
MARY ANN MASKERY (ABC): You talked about talking to 
Japanese automobile companies, trying to encourage them 
to get into investment in the United States. Do you think 
there will be any more encouragement from the U.S. govern-
ment for direct investment, or do you think the recent 
Japanese offer on auto parts will end the auto issue as 
such on the government-to-government level? 
AMBASSADOR: No, it won't end the auto issue, and our 
goyernment would still like to see Japanese car makers 
invest in theUnited States. But I think we should be 
hqnest about this and realize that even if all the things 
we ask the Japanese to do, except to reduce exports, 
wouldn't cure an unemployment problem which totals some-
where around 225-250,000 men at the present time. It will 
take two or three years for the changeover to occur, and 
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it's goi~g to be a difficult period, and especially so 
in tQis election year. 
CHARLES SMITH: Mr. Mansfield, you said that the United 
Stqtes intended to stick with South Korea to the end and 
to give full support to your friends in South Korea. In 
that case, I wonder what you feel about the policy of 
inhibiting SouthKorea's economic growth by restricting im-
ports into the United States of products, such as Korean 
colqr TV sets. 
AMBASSADOR: I wouldn't be in favor of it. I'm 
free trqder, I guess. (laughter) 
NOBORU ONOKI (Sankei): Mr. Ambassador, after the meet-
the 
ing between/Japanese Prime Minister and your President, 
your government official leaked that your President didn't 
~atisfy the recent past popular movement in Korea, and I 
believe that must have influenced these days' unrest coming 
~ 
up in the cquntry. On the other hand, it seems to me that 
during the past time, your . government agency has been en-
couraging some anti-governmental group to do something. 
Thank you. 
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AMBASSADOR: I wouldn't think so, and I would imagine 
that Ambqssador Gleysteen would know how to keep his hands 
cle~n qnd avoid. getting too close to the fire. If you are 
referring to a postulatP. at the time of the Ohira meetina. 
the question of Korea came up between him and President 
Carter, absolutelynot. Korea was not mentioned in any way, 
shape or form. 
JEAN PEARCE (Free lance}: A Japanese commentator in an 
article l read recently s~ggested that the real reason that 
the United States is interested in luring Japanese manufac-
turers to that country is that so they, the Japanese 
manufacturers, will then get strangl e d in negotiations with 
the United Automobile Workers Union, that's giving the 
American manufacturers an opportunity to catch up. I 
wonder if you could comment on th ~ t. (laughter) 
AMBASSAJOR: The Japanese auto manufacturers are not 
dumb. llaughter} 
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